ALPR Abuse Is Not Theoretical.

Across the country, law enforcement agencies are increasingly relying on automatic license plate reader systems to scan, store, and search vehicle location data. These tools can help police locate stolen vehicles, identify suspects, and respond to real public safety needs. But when ALPR systems operate without clear rules, strict oversight, and meaningful consequences for misuse, they create obvious opportunities for abuse.

A recent review by the Institute for Justice identified at least 14 reported cases in which law enforcement officers allegedly used ALPR systems to track romantic partners, exes, coworkers, family members, or strangers. These cases are a warning for Indiana. The problem is not that ALPR technology can never be used responsibly. The problem is that sensitive location data should never be available without enforceable safeguards.

Indiana currently has no statewide law governing ALPR data retention, access, transparency, or sharing. That means each agency is left to write its own policy, and the public is left hoping those policies are strong enough. Hope is not oversight.

The Pattern: Personal Access to Public Surveillance Tools

The cases identified by the Institute for Justice show a recurring pattern: officers allegedly used government surveillance databases for personal reasons. In many cases, the alleged misconduct was not discovered by an internal audit. Instead, victims reported stalking or suspicious behavior before the ALPR misuse came to light.

This is exactly why Eyes Off Indiana supports clear statewide standards. Every ALPR search should be logged. Every agency should be required to audit usage. Historical location data should have strict retention limits. Access to older data should require a warrant or documented investigative justification. Without those safeguards, even legitimate law enforcement tools can become tools of personal surveillance.

Fourteen Reported ALPR Romantic Stalking Cases

The Institute for Justice identified the following reported cases involving alleged ALPR misuse connected to romantic partners, ex-partners, coworkers, family members, or strangers:

Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, 2021: Officer Michael McSherry pleaded guilty to stalking charges after using license plate readers to track his estranged wife and other family members.

Kechi, Kansas, 2023: Lieutenant Victor Heiar pleaded guilty to computer crime and stalking after using Flock cameras to track his estranged wife.

Sedgwick, Kansas, 2023: Police Chief Lee Nygaard resigned after reportedly using Flock cameras to track his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend more than 200 times over several months.

Costa Mesa, California, 2023: Officer Robert Josett used a Flock camera system to track his mistress and her other romantic interests. He later pleaded guilty to multiple criminal charges in April 2026.

Riverside County, California, 2024: Deputy Alexander Vanny allegedly used the department’s Flock system to track one of his ex-fiancée’s friends after being arrested for kidnapping his ex-fiancée. He was convicted of multiple charges in December 2025.

Orange City, Florida, 2024: Officer Jarmarus Brown allegedly used ALPRs to stalk his girlfriend and her family members more than 100 times over seven months. He was arrested and charged in 2025.

Shelby County, Tennessee, 2024: Deputy Thadius Gordon was relieved of duty after allegedly using an ALPR database to track his ex-wife’s location more than 100 times.

Louisville, Kentucky, 2025: Officer Roberto Cedeno was charged with multiple felonies after allegedly using the city’s ALPR system to track an ex-partner and her friends hundreds of times over two months.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 2025: Officer Josue Ayala allegedly used the department’s Flock ALPR network to track a woman he was dating and her ex-partner nearly 180 times over two months. He resigned in 2026 after being charged with misconduct in public office.

Jerome County, Idaho, 2025: Sheriff George Oppedyk used a Flock system to search for his wife’s vehicle hundreds of times. Idaho’s Attorney General concluded that no crime was committed, but Oppedyk retired in April 2026, two years before the end of his term.

Kenosha County, Wisconsin, 2025: Sheriff’s Deputy Frank McGrath resigned after internal investigators found that he used the department’s Flock system to monitor another deputy with whom he was romantically involved.

Menasha, Wisconsin, 2025: Officer Cristian Morales was placed on leave and charged with misconduct in office after his ex-girlfriend filed a complaint alleging that he used a Flock system to track her.

Bonner Springs, Missouri, 2025: Detective Kyle Rector allegedly used license plate readers to track his estranged wife and two men he suspected were her new romantic partners. He was charged with multiple crimes in March 2026.

Monroe County, Florida, 2026: Sheriff’s Deputy Lamar Roman allegedly used an ALPR system to track and eventually pull over a woman he had met while providing security on a television set. He was arrested and charged with unauthorized access to a computer or electronic device.

Internal Safeguards Are Not Enough

ALPR vendors often point to audit logs and internal safeguards as evidence that misuse can be prevented. But the reported cases above show why internal safeguards alone are not enough. If misuse is discovered only after a victim reports stalking, the system has already failed.

Audit logs are useful only when agencies are required to review them. Access restrictions matter only when they are enforceable. Retention limits matter only when agencies are legally required to delete old data. Indiana should not rely on voluntary policies or vendor promises to protect the movements of millions of drivers.

What Indiana Should Do

Eyes Off Indiana supports responsible ALPR use with clear statewide standards. Indiana should adopt rules that protect privacy, preserve legitimate public safety uses, and reduce legal risk for agencies using this technology.

At minimum, Indiana should:

  • Set strict retention limits for non-relevant ALPR scans,
  • Require audit logs for every ALPR search,
  • Require regular review of ALPR access and usage,
  • Prohibit commercial sale or resale of ALPR data,
  • Require public transparency reports from agencies using ALPRs, and
  • Require a warrant or documented investigative justification for historical location searches.

The lesson from these cases is not that every officer will abuse access. The lesson is that no system involving mass location data should be built on trust alone. Clear rules protect the public, protect officers, and preserve legitimate uses of the technology.

Indiana should act before abuse happens here.

This article is based on reporting by Christopher Ingraham and the Institute for Justice. Read the original Institute for Justice article here: Police Have Reportedly Used License Plate Readers to Stalk Romantic Interests at Least 14 Times in Recent Years.

Sign the Eyes Off Indiana petition to support clear statewide limits on ALPR surveillance in Indiana.