Protecting privacy. Preserving progress.

Eyes Off Indiana advocates for clear, statewide standards for law enforcement's use of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) that protect privacy and support effective, accountable policing.

Live Data

Indiana's ALPR footprint in real time

Total ALPR Cameras Identified

3128

Crowdsourced reports of ALPR units found across Indiana. Actual statewide totals are significantly higher.

Counties with Documented Readers

84 of 92

ALPR readers have been documented in nearly every Indiana county.

Plates Scanned in Indiana Today

Loading today's scan estimate...

Estimated total plates scanned across Indiana so far today.

In the Nation Per Capita

6th

Indiana ranks sixth in the nation for ALPR cameras per capita — one reader for every 2,273 Hoosiers, up from one per 64,713 eighteen months ago.

A New Camera Documented

Every 3.4 hrs

On average over the past year, as coverage expands rapidly across the state.

Eyes Off Indiana Petition Signatures

2,312

The number of Hoosiers calling for clear limits on ALPR data use is growing every day. Add your name here.

Data sourced from our partner deflock.me 16 hours ago · For county-by-county numbers and how Indiana compares with all 50 states, see our data report Indiana by the Numbers .

About

Clear rules for a powerful technology

Eyes Off Indiana is a nonpartisan nonprofit working to establish clear, statewide limits on automatic license plate reader (ALPR) use in Indiana. We support lawful, effective policing and believe modern tools work best when governed by clear, consistent rules.

ALPR systems capture passing license plates and generate location records, yet Indiana has no statewide standards for data retention, sharing, or transparency. We study how ALPRs are used, educate the public, and work with state lawmakers to adopt reasonable, enforceable protections that uphold constitutional rights, protect agencies from liability, and preserve ALPRs' legitimate public-safety value.

Our Roadmap
  1. Late 2025 · Complete

    Mapping the Footprint

  2. Early 2026 · Complete

    Sounding the Alarm

  3. Now · In Progress

    At the Statehouse

  4. Early 2027 · Upcoming

    Changing the Law

The Issue

Indiana has zero statewide regulation on law enforcement's use of ALPRs

Three gaps in state law leave officers, agencies, and the public without ground rules.

Indefinite Data Retention

Indiana places no limit on how long police can keep ALPR data. Without mandatory deletion rules, agencies can store years of location records from routine scans, allowing long-term monitoring of citizens' movements with no oversight or expiration.

Unrestricted Sharing and Sale of Data

With no rules on who can access ALPR records, officers and agencies can share — or even sell — Hoosiers' location data with whomever they like, including out-of-state agencies, federal databases, and private vendors.

Lack of Transparency and Oversight

Indiana has no statewide standards requiring transparency or oversight for ALPR use. Without clear requirements for audit logs, reporting, or review, it is difficult to verify that ALPR systems are used consistently and according to policy.

Policy Goals

Six standards we're asking the legislature to set

Specific, enforceable guardrails that keep ALPR technology constitutional and accountable.

01

Delete Scans in 30 Days

  • Scans that don't match an alert are deleted within 30 days.
  • The deadline applies to vendors holding the data too.
  • Data is kept longer only with a warrant, an active investigation, an owner request, or a litigation hold.
02

No Data Market

  • Plate data can never be sold, licensed, or traded to data brokers or anyone else.
  • Vendors can only touch the data for maintenance the agency requests.
  • The data stays confidential, so it can't be released in bulk.
03

Sharing Only for Public Safety

  • Police can still share with other agencies for real cases.
  • Real-time alerts, task forces, and mutual aid all keep working.
  • Stolen-vehicle, missing-person, and warrant searches are unaffected.
04

A Scan Alone Isn't Suspicion

  • A non-match can't, by itself, justify suspicion or probable cause.
  • An automated alert can't be the only reason for a stop, search, or arrest.
  • Officers must confirm an alert is accurate and current before acting.
05

Logging & Public Portals

  • Every search is logged — who, when, and why — and kept for two years.
  • System use is audited regularly.
  • Each agency runs a public portal, updated monthly, showing how its system is used.
06

Open Contracts & Enforcement

  • Vendor contracts are public — no hiding price, retention, or sharing terms.
  • People can sue when the rules are broken.
  • Lawsuits can recover damages, court orders, and attorney's fees.
Voices from Hoosiers

From our petition — in their own words

Hoosiers from every side of the political spectrum despise mass surveillance systems with no guard rails. We used to be a proper state that championed civil liberties.

Resident from 46140

No one voted for this intrusion on our privacy. I am old enough to remember when Republicans used to stand for limited government.

Resident from 46530

These cameras were sold as local use and limited storage, not a national database of our travel and behavioral patterns with our information shared with other jurisdictions.

Resident from 47725
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

No. Eyes Off Indiana supports law enforcement and the responsible use of ALPR technology. ALPRs are valuable tools for solving crimes, recovering stolen vehicles, and locating missing or endangered individuals, and when used properly they can directly support public safety and save lives. Our work is not about restricting police, but about ensuring this technology is governed by clear, statewide rules that protect officers, agencies, and the public alike. The absence of standards—such as defined retention limits, access controls, and oversight—creates legal risk and undermines public trust. We advocate for reasonable, enforceable safeguards that keep ALPRs effective, accountable, and fully consistent with constitutional principles.

No—because the risks of keeping that data far outweigh the rare cases where it might help. ALPR data almost never solves cold cases. The overwhelming majority of scans have no connection to any crime, and data older than a few weeks is almost never useful. Meanwhile, long-term retention creates real dangers: misuse by officers, unauthorized sharing, data breaches, and the quiet expansion of mass surveillance. Police can still retain plate records tied to active investigations through a written request. But storing everyone’s movements “just in case” turns a public safety tool into a tracking system for millions of innocent people. Tracking every car with GPS would help solve crimes too, but we don’t allow that because it violates basic rights. This is no different.

Requiring a warrant may sound like a safeguard, but it still allows the government to stockpile location data on millions of innocent drivers. Once that data exists, it can be leaked, misused, or quietly repurposed, no matter how strict the access rules are. A warrant controls who can look—but not what is stored, how long, or what might happen to it later. Deletion prevents those risks by removing data that is not tied to an active case. It also discourages lazy investigations that rely on broad data mining instead of focused leads. ALPR is most effective in real time or shortly after a crime occurs. If a case emerges, police can request that specific records be preserved. But by default, deletion after 30 days is the strongest protection for both public safety and civil liberties.

“Nothing to hide” has never been the standard for constitutional rights. You protect your home, your phone, and your personal information not because you are hiding crimes, but because privacy is part of basic security. ALPR data is the same. Once long-term location records exist, they can be and already have been misused, including officers looking up an ex-partner’s movements, checking who visits certain clinics or churches, or monitoring political activity out of curiosity. These abuses happen precisely because the data is there. Protecting privacy is not about hiding something; it is about preventing powerful tools from being turned against innocent people.

A single image in public is not the issue. The problem is scale. Some cities have ALPRs at nearly every intersection, making it almost impossible to drive without being recorded. That creates a detailed, long-term map of a person’s movements, far beyond what anyone reasonably expects when they leave home. In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court held that long-term location tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment, even when each individual moment occurs in public. ALPR networks can replicate that same level of intrusive tracking if no limits are in place.

Your phone collects data because you choose to carry it and can control, limit, or turn off those services. ALPR tracking is different: it is done by the government, requires no consent, and cannot be opted out of. You can leave your phone at home; you cannot avoid driving past government-run cameras placed at every intersection. And unlike private phone data, ALPR records can be pooled, shared, or searched by agencies without you ever knowing. The issue is not the technology; it is involuntary, government-run location tracking with no clear limits.